
Abstract: This article explores the changing nature of security governance in Northern Europe since the end of the Cold War. Prior to enlargement in 2004 European Union (EU) involvement in the region was limited and cautious, with security governance driven predominantly by regional actors. At the same time, the connection between ‘security’ and projects of ‘regional cooperation’ was complex and largely interdependent. Since 2004 the EU has become more engaged in the region, most recently through its new Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region via which the north is conceptualised as a possible test case for broader conceptions of regional governance in Europe. The article argues that such developments raise significant questions, not only for the future and nature of regional security conceptions in the north, but also in respect of how the EU conceptualises itself in relation to security more generally.
Abstract: This article develops a methodological approach to analyse the logic of security in the European Union (EU) as an inter-subjective construction. Security is established when discursive practices take place at the interplay of three different fields: (1) EU identity constructions; (2) the perception of challenges as security relevant; and (3) constructions of security practices and hence discourses on governance and governmentality. When discursive practices make cross-references between these fields they construct the logic of security. The empirical section applies this method in order to analyse the EU’s logic of security at the turn of the twenty-first century. Understanding the dynamic effects at play between situations of under-development and conflict led not only to the construction of the need to implement civilian as well as military capabilities at the EU level, but this dynamic is also central to understanding the EU’s way of approaching international terrorism.
Excerpt of the Introduction
“Europeans,” an epithet that once denoted belonging to various unrelated–and, at times, hostile–cultures, began their adventurous integration process more than six decades ago. Along the way, established legal cultures merged their traditional roots with concepts of regional reconstruction and unification. Creating an influential economic elite and an appropriate counterpart to the nation-state were two of the defining objectives of the orchestrators of the European project. Attempts at political integration were slow to materialize, however, until the end of the Cold War brought about dramatic transformations that made Europe increasingly receptive to change. This change–a deepening integration within an enlarged continent and the progressive making of a Europe “united in its diversity” –culminated in 2009 with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Abstract: The US invasion of Afghanistan, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, was originally conceived in narrow strategic terms. However, what began as a counter-terrorism policy, based on eliminating and eradicating al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, led to increasing calls for nation-building and the establishment of a democratic state. This ‘mission creep’ was increasingly associated with the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda, and consequently the democratisation of Afghanistan became a central US security objective. In spite of this, however, the Bush administration was never able to reconcile the tensions between countering terrorism and promoting democracy. This was exacerbated by policy decisions that generated greater insecurity in Afghanistan, which amounts to a disturbing picture of mishandling and negligence. As such, when the Obama administration inherited the Afghanistan campaign, the situation was worse than that which had been seen at the start of the war. This has resulted in the Obama administration abandoning the notion of democracy promotion in favour of transferring power as quickly as possible to an illegitimate Afghan government. This article details the ebbs and flows of US–Afghan policy as it relates to the Freedom Agenda, whilst highlighting the contradictions and problems that the US has faced over nearly a decade of war.
Abstract: Debate about the nature of security has flourished in many parts of the world since before the end of the Cold War. Throughout that time, Europe has proved to be a major focus for research in what has been termed non-traditional – in some ways, non-American – security studies. Ours is not an argument about ownership: one can find non-traditional security studies globally, yet there has been a consistency to the development of non-traditional theorizing in Europe, often facilitated by research grants from bodies such as the European Union. With ‘securitization theory’, ‘emancipation theory’ and ‘insecuritization theory’ three theories have developed in particular. Whilst much has been written about the theoretical details of each of these theories their empirical applications remains comparatively scant. Informed by the beliefs that a) only empirical applications will solve some of the theoretical dilemmas inherent to each theory, and b) that the utility of theory can ultimately only be assessed through practical application, our aim in this essay is to animate scholars to apply these theories to empirical research.